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?. Introduction
 
The financial crisis of the late 1980s to 1990s occurred in the United
 
States,Europe,Japan,and Newly industrialized East Asian countries has
 
been viewed among economists as one of the most serious economic
 
problems of the 20?century,in addition to the Great Depression of the
 
1930s. The financial crisis hitting Korea in the half of 1997 had impact
 
on the overall economy such as the worst recession,unemployment in the
 
post-war era. After only two years after the crisis,the performance of
 
Korea’s economy was outstanding,showing the recovery from the crisis
 
and the struggles for economic reforms and restructuring across sectors.
Japan’s economy has also been experiencing a decade prolonged reces-
sion, the highest rate of unemployment and serious financial problems
 
after the burst of bubble out of a long boom generated in financial and
 
real estate sectors. Why did this financial crisis in Korea happen and
 
how the economy has turned around back to the fast recovery? What
 
lessons from the financial crisis and recovery in Korea and from the
 
similar financial and bank crisis and the prolonged recession in Japan?
This paper address these questions by focusing structural aspects and an
 
asymmetric information framework to understand the causes and the
 
propagation mechanism of the financial crisis in Korea and Japan.
?.The Causes and Channels of Financial Crisis
 
1. What is a Financial Crisis ?
A financial crisis is defined as a major disruption in financial markets
 
in which adverse selection and moral hazard problems become worse,so
 
that financial markets are unable to efficiently channel funds to those
 
who have the most productive investment opportunities??.
The financial system should perform the essential function of channel-
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 ing funds to those individuals or firms that have productive investment
 
opportunities. In order for the financial system to function well in this
 
sense,it is required participants in financial markets to be able to make
 
accurate decisions about which investment opportunities are more or less
 
creditworthy. However, the financial system may not function well
 
because it usually confronts problems of asymmetric information, in
 
which one party to a financial contract has usually better information
 
about the potential return and risk associated with the investment proj-
ects they plan to undertake than lenders do.
Among explanations of financial crises,the view that financial crises
 
primarily result from information problems,which is explained in this
 
section, has drawn attentions recently. In particular, it is argued that
 
financial crises arise when disruptions to the financial system due to
 
asymmetric information cause such a large surge in adverse selection and
 
moral hazard problems that financial markets are unable to channel
 
funds efficiently from savers to investors.
Before discussing the causes of financial crisis, it is useful to discuss
 
how asymmetric information leads to adverse selection and moral hazard.
Asymmetric information is said to exist between a buyer and seller of an
 
asset or a contract if one party has insufficient knowledge or imperfect
 
information about the other party involved in the transaction to make
 
accurate decisions.
Adverse Selection in Financial Markets:Adverse selection is a problem
 
that arises for buyers of assets or contracts when they have difficulty
 
assessing the quality of these assets in advance of purchase. It is a
 
lender’s problem of distinguishing the good-risk applicants, or their
 
business plans of investment projects,from the bad-risk applicants before
 
making contracts, hence a investment decision. Consequently, it is a
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problem that arises because of asymmetric information between buyers
 
and sellers of assets before any purchase agreement takes place. Specifi-
cally,the adverse selection problem means that steps taken by buyers to
 
protect themselves against purchases of poor quality assets may have the
 
perverse effect of lowering the average quality of the pool of assets that
 
sellers bring to the market. In short,adverse selection is an adverse pool
 
effect.
Adverse selection is a serious problem in financial markets, because
 
financial transactions are intrinsically characterized by asymmetric infor-
mation. Borrowers, sellers of financial assets, generally have private
 
information that is more accurate than the information possessed by
 
lenders,buyers of financial assets,regarding the attributes and prospects
 
of borrowers. Consequently,a lender may still be uncertain about the
 
default risk of a loan contract even after checking into the risk factors
 
for a borrower??.
The most obvious possible solution to adverse selection in financial
 
markets is,in theory,the improvement of imperfect information or the
 
elimination of the asymmetry in information that exists between buyers
 
and sellers of financial assets prior to purchase agreements.
Moral Hazard in Financial Markets:Moral hazard is said to exist in the
 
context of a financial market if, after a purchase agreement has been
 
concluded between a buyer and seller of a financial asset:for example,the
 
seller changes his or her behavior in such a way that the probabilities,
that is,risk calculations,used by the buyer to assess the quality of the
 
financial asset are no longer accurate;the buyer of the financial asset is
 
only imperfectly able to monitor or observe this change in the seller’s
 
behavior??. That is,moral hazard arises in a financial market after a
 
financial transaction has taken place,when the seller of a financial asset
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 has an incentive to conceal information and to act in a way that may not
 
reflect interests of the buyer of financial assets. Thus,the moral hazard
 
has important consequences for financial structure and financial system.
Ways to solve this issue is related with an ability or costs associated with
 
a lender’s verifying that borrowers are using their funds as intended.
2. Why Financial Instability or Crisis Occurs?:Causes and Channels
 
Why financial instability or crisis occurs ?According to asymmetric
 
information analysis,financial intermediaries,particularly banks,have a
 
very important role in financial markets in that they are well-suited to
 
engage in information-producing activities that encourage channeling
 
funds among sectors to facilitate productive investment for the economy.
The weak role of these institutions,such as financial intermediation and
 
the supply of loans, will lead directly to a decline in investment and
 
aggregate economic activity. One explanation why the weak role of
 
financial system leads to downturn in real economic activity is as follows.
When shocks to the financial system make information problem worse,
the credit for lending available tends to decline or dry up. The financial
 
constraints due to the lack of credit leads households and firms to cut or
 
to delay their spending,resulting in a contraction of economic activity.
Sometimes, a drastic or major disruption in financial institutions or
 
financial markets,called financial crisis,results in a sharp drop in real
 
economic activity,called severe recession or low growth of an economy.
Four categories of factors can result in increases in asymmetric infor-
mation and thus can induce to trigger financial instability and crises:
deterioration of financial sector balance sheet,increase in interest rates;
increase in lender uncertainty;asset market effects on balance sheets of
 
nonfinancial sector. These factors will help understand why banking
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and financial crises occur and how they reduce to sharp contraction in
 
aggregate economic activity. Mishikin (1999,2000)
Deterioration of Financial Sector Balance Sheets
 
According to the literatures on asymmetric information and financial
 
structure,financial intermediaries (commercial banks,thrift institutions,
finance companies,insurance companies,mutual funds and pension funds)
play an important role in the sense that they have both the ability and the
 
economic incentive to address asymmetric information problem with
 
which participants in financial system confront. Banks and other finan-
cial intermediaries have economic incentives and the ability to collect and
 
produce information when they consider making a loan. Comparing to
 
stocks market,the loans are private and not traded because other inves-
tors cannot buy the loan directly,not simply following pattern of others.
Thus the ability to lend loans by banks reduces free rider problem and
 
moral hazard. These natural advantages of banks explain why banks
 
and other intermediaries have such a special important role in financial
 
markets through the world. Their roles in the financial system imply
 
that if their ability to lend is not well-functioned or impaired, overall
 
lending will decline and the economy will contact. A deterioration in the
 
balance sheets of financial intermediaries indeed hinders their ability to
 
lend and thus a key determinant of promoting financial crises??.
Evidences from Korea and Japan suggest that it seems to be important
 
to understand a channel of the balance sheets through which economic
 
crises could be transmitted to sectors between corporate (non-financial)
sector and financial sector because it also reflects the structural aspect of
 
financial system. This micro-level aspect of propagation mechanism will
 
give us useful implications to have a deep and full scale mechanism of
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 financial crisis.
The mechanism of balance sheet effect works as follows:declining
 
asset prices reduces the value of collateral that borrowers can use to
 
secure loans. There are two effects on balance sheets:direct and in-
direct. A fall in price of real estate assets such as land and house prices
 
directly reduces the value of collateral on a loan secured by the real
 
estate. A fall in firm’s stock price may signal, from the investors or
 
through stock market, declining future cash flows that can be used to
 
payoff debts. In short, factors or channels affecting balance sheets of
 
non-financial sectors include change in the value of collateral due to
 
decrease in asset price, change in market value of firm’s “net worth,”
which perform a similar role to collateral,due to decline in stock market,
unexpected changes in the rate of inflation.
Through these channels mentioned above, decrease in asset prices??
could induce a sudden downturn of aggregate real economic activity in
 
Korea or a prolonged recession in Japan. It is worth to note a kind of
 
multiplier effect which is originated financial sector:the decline in aggre-
gate activity further reduces asset prices,which perpetuates the down-
turn,deepening recession,that is,severe and prolonged recession. This
 
financial propagation mechanism is called as “financial accelerator”.
One example has been transparent in Japan. The collapse of asset price
 
such as land and stock prices in Japan,beginning with after bubble burst
 
between the late 1980s and early 1990s,induced banking crisis that helped
 
generate downturn in real activity,causing the long depression in Japan.
Increases in Interest Rates
 
The adverse selection due to asymmetric information can lead to
“credit rationing,”in which some borrowers are denied loans even when
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they are willing to pay a higher interest rate. When market interest
 
rates are driven up sufficiently,for some reasons??,there may will be a
 
situation with an insufficient supply of loanable funds,the excess demand
 
for loanable funds at the original interest rate,called as a“credit crunch”.
In this case where interest rates in a credit crunch will tend to rise,
adverse selection may become a problem, possibly leading to “credit
 
rationing”in which some borrowers are denied loans even when they are
 
willing to pay a higher interest rates??.
Prudent borrowers such as individuals,firms or investors,who pursue
 
modestly risk investment projects with modest expectation of gains may
 
be discouraged from borrowing and are more likely to decide to exit the
 
market for loanable funds. Borrowers with the highly risky investment
 
projects that promise the possibility of a high return rate,though not with
 
high probability, are those who are willing to pay the highest interest
 
rates??. Lenders anticipating this adverse selection effect, may then
 
become discouraged from lending, which would shift the supply curve
 
even further to the left. In this setting, a higher interest rate leads to
 
even greater adverse selection. That is, the highest interest rate
 
increases the likelihood that the lender is lending to a bad credit risk.
In short,the original shock to the supply curve of funds that caused it
 
to shift to the left could be followed by further leftward shifts due to
 
adverse selection effects,amplifying the negative impact of the original
 
shock on lending and borrowing activity. The result could be a substan-
tial decline in investment,hence dimmed prospects for economic growth
 
and development. Increases in interest rates can also have a negative
 
effect on bank balance sheets.
The assets of a bank typically have longer duration assets than its
 
liabilities. In this structure, a rise in interest rates directly causes a
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 decline in banks’s net worth. This is because,in present value terms,the
 
interest rate lowers the value of assets with longer maturity duration
 
more than it raises the value of liabilities with their shorter duration.
Increases in Uncertainty and Inconsistent Expectation
 
Suppose a negative financial shock occurs―perhaps an unexpected
 
failure of a major financial firm or nonfinancial institution, previously
 
thought to have been in good financial condition,or from a recession,or
 
from uncertainty about the future direction of government policies.
These kind of surprising negative events can lead to increased uncer-
tainty among lenders concerning the attributes and prospects of potential
 
borrowers.
Given this increased uncertainty,lenders become harder to screen out
 
good from bad credit risks. The lessened ability of lenders to solve
 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems thus may become more
 
reluctant to lend at any given interest rate,leading to a decline in lending,
investment,and aggregate activity.
In the loanable fund markets in equilibrium, the supply curve for
 
loanable funds may shift to the left. This leftward shift, resulting in
 
higher interest rates could then induce adverse selection effects in finan-
cial markets,causing further leftward shifts in the supply curve and hence
 
further reductions in lending and borrowing activity.
Asset Market Effects on Nonfinancial Sector Balance Sheet
 
The state of corporate balance sheets of nonfinancial firms has the
 
most important implications for asymmetric information problems in the
 
financial system. The weak state of balance sheets among borrowers
 
will worse the degree of adverse selection and moral hazard problems in
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financial markets,thus promoting instability of financial system in broad
 
sense. This could occur through variety of channels in the economy.
Recent research includes possible ways to address asymmetric informa-
tion such as collateral,the net worth.
Collateral is an important way often used by lenders to solve asym-
metric problems. Collateral reduces the consequences of adverse or
 
moral hazard because it reduces the render’s losses in the case of default.
But if asset price decreases and the value of collateral falls,then asym-
metric problem suddenly arises.
The real net worth of a corporation is the difference between what it
 
owns (its assets) and what it owes (its liabilities), measured in real
 
purchasing power terms. In general,the creditors of a corporation are
 
entitled to take ownership of its assets in case of default. Thus,the real
 
net worth of,the corporation plays a similar role to collateral not only in
 
helping to ease lenders’fear regarding both adverse selection and moral
 
hazard,but also in helping to encourage more responsible behavior on the
 
part of corporate borrowers. Consequently,a wide spread deterioration
 
of balance sheets among borrowers which result in negative shocks to the
 
real net worth of corporations exacerbate adverse selection and moral
 
hazard problems in financial markets and make lenders less willing to
 
lend,promoting financial instability.
What kinds of factors make the real net worth be deteriorated ?
Theses possible factors help understand how the reduction in net worth
 
increases the adverse selection and moral hazard problems facing lenders
 
and reduces investment and aggregate economic activity.
These negative shocks to real net worth can stem from a variety of
 
factors. Among factors affecting changes in the real net worth includes
 
negative stock market shock; negative inflation rate shock; negative
― ―109 Understanding AMechanismofFinancial CrisisandRecession:CasesofKorea and Japan
 exchange rate shock;positive interest shock??.
In addition,an increase in interest rates on financial instruments also
 
has a direct negative impact on the real net worth of both households and
 
firms. All else equal,an increase in interest rate on financial instruments
 
means that household and business borrowers must now pay more for
 
loanable funds. Consequently, they experience a decrease in their cash
 
flow,defined as the difference between their cash receipts and their cash
 
expenditures. Decreased cash flow in turn means that households and
 
firms are less liquid,which increases the uncertainty of lenders regarding
 
the ability of households and firms to meet their debt obligations. As
 
previously noted, increases in lender uncertainty can lead to leftward
 
shifts in the supply curve for loanable funds, which leads to further
 
increases in interest rates. In short,putting the two effects of increased
 
interest rate together,both tend to lead to leftward shifts in the supply
 
curve for loanable funds and hence to further interest rate increases and
 
amplified adverse selection problems.
?.Financial Crisis and Recovery in Korea
 
1. The Origins of the Financial Crisis in Korea:Competing Views
 
There are disagreements or competing views on the main causes of
 
financial crisis among economists. An evident split could be found
 
between those who view the crisis as the product of a number of struc-
tural weaknesses and those who see it mainly as a liquidity crisis.
Structural Weakness
 
Strategy of economic development in Korea was successful in transfor-
ming the country from one of the poorest nations in the early 1960s to an
 
industrialized country and a member of the OECD by 1996. This achieve-
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 ment of rapid economic growth at the same time created a number of
 
structural weakness that we can also see in many emerging economies
 
and Japan.
To those who agree this first view,the crisis is the product of structural
 
weakness so that it is inevitable result that creates an economic environ-
ment,making Korea vulnerable to the financial crisis. They highlight
 
vulnerabilities of the economy,ranging from bankruptcy of the Chaebol
(Big industrial group) to political uncertainty apparent in early 1997.
Among main weakness inherited in the economy,following four weakness
 
appears to have been fundamental.
Corporate Sector’s Financial Structure:The corporate sector had low
 
level of profitability and high level of debt(the highly leveraged corporate
 
financial structure),reflecting the tendency of the business conglomerates
 
to diversify across a wide range of activities. Such an approach was
 
encouraged by a weak corporate governance framework and the moral
 
hazard resulting from“a too big to fail”mentality. This was partially
 
due to a consequence of industrial policy implemented by government at
 
the early stage of economic growth.
Financial System Distorted and Underdeveloped:Financial system of
 
Korea had been poorly-functioning in that it followed government direc-
tion in allocating capital and had poor credit analysis and internal risk
 
control mechanisms. This becomes the main object of the financial
 
reform and restructuring after the crises.
Financial Liberalization and Short-term Orientation of Private Sector’s
 
Debts:Following comprehensive financial deregulation and the liberaliza-
tion of capital market (mainly,short-term overseas borrowing)in 1993,
the external debt had been rising relative to GDP rapidly and continuous-
ly???. Rapid increase in private sector,both direct borrowing by corpo-
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 rate sector and bank borrowing to finance investment by corporate sector
 
accounted for the most of the growth in external debt. The external
 
debt by both corporations and financial institution has been built by a
 
high level of short-term foreign debt,reflecting excessive risk-taking and
 
insufficient attention to credit and exchange rate risks.
A lack of transparency and the investor confidence:These weaknesses
 
were compounded by a lack of transparency, which made investors
 
uncertain about trends in key variables, such as foreign debt, foreign
 
exchange reserves and non-performing assets. Increase in uncertainty
 
resulted in the loss of investor confidence.
According to this view,the crisis was interpreted as an almost inevi-
table punishment for the sins of“crony capitalism.”
A Liquidity Crisis
 
According to the second view of liquidity crisis,the essence of the crisis
 
was that foreign banks refused to roll over short-term debt, offering
 
various reasons why foreign bankers were unwilling to do that. They
 
pay attentions to typically not only the fact there were mistakes in
 
economic management,but also such factors as contagion effects from
 
other countries and the herding behavior of foreign investors.
This view argues,emphasizing short term capital flow,that in almost
 
every situation, countries with short-term liabilities to foreign bankers
 
that exceed reserves were likely to experience a sudden and massive
 
reversal in capital flows. Furthermore,greater short-term exposure was
 
associated with more severe crisis when capital flows reverse. They
 
refer this“self-fulfilling confidence crisis”in that countries set themselves
 
up for trouble because they had far more short-term debt than they did
 
the resources or reserves to rapid repay skittish creditors???. This in-
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 duced capital flight or refusal to roll-over which result in once-boom and
 
sudden cash.
2. Chronology of Korea’s Financial Crisis
 
What happened in Korea’s crisis? In order to prevent second crisis,it
 
is necessary to understand channels through which shocks were transmit-
ted to yield financial crisis we could observe. The chain of events
 
leading to the crisis began with unfavorable external shock,that is,the
 
terms-of-trade shock in 1996???,which was primarily due to the significant
 
fall in the prices of export goods such as semiconductor chips,steel,and
 
chemical products, especially, the collapse of semiconductor prices???.
This terms of trade shock put heavy pressure on the already thin profit
 
margins of firms:both the large corporate(conglomerates)and the small
 
and medium-sized firms closely tied to them. This external pressure
 
exacerbated the balance-sheet problems of Korea’s highly-indebted corpo-
rate sector:corporate sector’s net income turned negative in 1997,leading
 
to major corporate bankruptcies or insolvencies in 1997???:a 50 percent
 
jump in bankruptcies and the collapse of seven of the 30-largest chaebols.
The problem in corporate sector spilled over into the financial sector,
increasing the amount of non-performing loans (NPLS). The accumula-
tion of these problems in the banking system (exploding NPLs) and
 
financial sector in general(deterioration of the overall soundness),caused
 
investors to re-evaluate the risks of investing in Korea. To make
 
matters worse, Korea’s financial structure of private sector and the
 
government’s attempts to intervene in foreign exchange markets to
 
stabilize the value of the currency,won,made investors more uncertain
 
about liquidity and ability to service short-term foreign debt.
The private sector with financial structure characterized by a large
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 short-term oriented foreign debt,which was driven by mainly banks and
 
the large firms (big conglomerates), became increasingly vulnerable to
 
external shock, implying highly mismatched external asset position.
The lack of transparency regarding foreign exchange reserves and total
 
external liability positions also significantly contributed to the loss of the
 
nation’s credibility,thereby resulting in the loss of investors’confidence in
 
the international financial markets. Through periods prior to most of
 
1997,foreign lenders took comfort based on the expectation that Korean
 
government was capable of rendering support if needed,especially to the
 
Korean banking system. However, the expectation was reversed and
 
the problem became serious in early December 1997,when it was revealed
 
that the central bank,the Bank of Korea,had already committed the bulk
 
of its reserves to foreign branches of Korean banks. With usable official
 
reserves below $10 billion and short-term external debt in the range of
$100 billion,there was an acute market expectation and realization that,
even if the Korean government wanted to support external obligations of
 
domestic banks or corporations,it might not have the resources to do so.
Financial markets were highly focused on the large gap between short-
term external debt and usable reserve. In the final days of December
 
1997, there was an incipient financial melt-down even though the
 
president-elect had committed a far-reaching IMF adjustment program.
When foreign banks refused to roll over their loans,Korea was forced to
 
turn to the IMF for assistance in December 1997???.
3. Propagation Mechanism of Financial Crisis
 
To have better understand about the mechanism of financial crisis
 
outlined in the previous section,we can divide series of events into two
 
stages:the first stage is from changes in economic environment such as
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 financial liberalization and deregulation to the currency crisis, the next
 
stage is the process from currency crisis to financial crisis.
(1) The First Stage to Currency Crisis
 
The first stage to the currency crisis typically has been financial
 
liberalization such as deregulation on interest-rate ceiling and the type of
 
lending. The Korean economy experienced net capital inflows since
 
1990. Once financial liberalization was adopted, the inflow of interna-
tional capital into banks as well as the portfolio investment (foreign
 
purchases of Korean stocks and bonds)have been dramatically increased
 
especially for three years from 1994 to 1996. In this period,the dominant
 
type of capital transaction was debt contracts, which account for the
 
most of total foreign portfolio investment. On the other hand, stock
 
investment by foreign investors was the limited portion of capital inflows
 
because there was a quantity restriction on stock investment by for-
eigners. This was why the surge in net capital inflows resulted in a rapid
 
increase in external debt in Korea. This capital inflow was further
 
aggravated by government’s exchange rate polices, pegging exchange
 
rate to the dollars.
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 Figure 1 Trends and Composition of Net Capital Inflows to Korea
 
Figure 2 Composition of Portfolio Investment
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Source:IMF (2000)
Table 1 Stock of External Liabilities,Korea 1994-99
(in billions of US dollars)
1994 1995 1996 1998 1999Q3
 
Short-term external liabilities 53.7 71.6 93.0 30.7 35.0
(Percent of total external liabilities) (55.4) (56.3) (56.6) (20.6) (24.8)
Ⅰ.Financial institutions 44.7 58.6 73.0 18.9 19.4
Ａ.Domestic financial institutions 2/ 35.5 47.6 60.0 11.3 10.7
Resident domestic financial institutions 3/ 10.3 18.7 26.1 6.3 6.9
Off-shorebanking ofdomesticfinancialinsti 3.1 3.9 7.5 2.0 1.0
Foreign branches of domestic financial insti 22.0 25.0 26.4 3.0 2.8
Ｂ.Branches of foreign banks 6/ 9.2 11.0 13.0 7.6 8.7
Ⅱ.Domestic corporation 7/8 9.0 13.0 20.0 11.8 15.5
Medium and long-term external liabilities 43.3 55.5 71.4 118.0 106.0
(Percent of total external liabilities) (39.9) (44.6) (43.7) (79.4) (75.2)
Ⅰ.Financial institutions 20.5 31.0 43.5 52.0 46.9
Ａ.Domestic financial institutions 2/ 18.8 28.7 40.0 45.8 42.0
Resident domestic financial instituitons 3/ 12.5 17.2 23.0 28.2 25.8
Off-shorebanking ofdomesticfinancialinsti 3.9 7.8 11.7 9.9 8.9
Foreign branches of domestic financial insti 2.4 3.7 5.3 7.8 7.3
Ｂ.Branches of foreign banks 6/ 1.7 2.3 3.5 6.3 4.9
Ⅱ.Domestic corporations 7/8 15.6 17.9 21.8 29.4 31.0
Ⅲ.Public Sector 7.2 6.7 6.1 36.5 28.1
Ａ. IMF ― ― ― 16.9 6.0
Ｂ.World Bank 9/ 2.0 1.8 1.8 7.5 8.5
Ｃ.Asian Development Bank 9/ 0.5 0.4 0.4 4.0 4.0
Ｄ.Market financing 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.2 4.2
Ｅ.Other 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.9 5.4
Total external liabilities 97.0 127.1 164.4 148.7 141.0
Memorandum item :
Borrowings of nonresident nonfinancial Korean corporations 9/ 22.5 32.5 46.2 40.6 ...
Source:IMF (2000),Korean authorities;and staff estimates.
1/Excluding nonresident holdings of domestic bonds,estimated at U$0.8 billion at end-December 1998.
2/Includes commercial banks,specialized banks,merchant banks,and development institutions.
3/Includes commercial paper,call money,refinance,and term loans.
4/Domestic finanicial institutions’offshore borrowing,excluding interoffice accounts.
5/Domestic financial institutions’overseas branches and subsidiaries, excluding interoffice accounts. The data in the table exclude the nonresident deposits in the overseas branches and subsidiaries of domestic financial institutions.
6/Includes nonresidents’deposit,call money,refinance,term-loan,and interoffice account borr-
owings.
7/Includes trade credit,loans for oil imports,and advance receipts of export.
8/In line with international standards, these data exclude nonresident subsidiaries of Korean corporations.
9/Including structural adjustment lending beginning December 1997.
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 Who were involved in the increase in external debt during the period?
The banking sector was involved in 70％ out of the total increase in
 
external debt,while the corporate sector’s external debt related to trade
 
financing explained the remaining 30％ of total debt. However,note that
 
merchant banks which were affiliated or owned by corporations of big
 
business groups,Chaebol,were also aggressively involved in the growth
 
of external debt. Why does international capital inflow to banks in the
 
emerging market economies? First,there were new profit opportunities
 
in domestic financial markets due to deregulation arbitrage. Second,
banks paid high yields in order to attract funds to rapidly increase their
 
lending, loan. Third, such investment projects funded by banks were
 
assumed to be protected by a government safety net.
The capital inflows fueled a lending boom in banking sector. In the
 
process of lending, the general attitude to lending was excessive risk-
taking on the part of banks???,which led to huge non-performing loan.
This resulted in deterioration of balance sheets in banks and other
 
financial institutions. The condition of balance sheets was also deterior-
ated by changes in asset market such as a decline in stock and land prices
 
as well as the high degree of illiquidity of loan assets. This deterioration
 
of balance sheets in financial sector, by itself, might be sufficient to
 
induce a financial and economic crisis. This was because the resulting
 
credit crunch to restrict lending or bank insolvency could stagger the
 
economy. The weak state of the banking sector before crisis set the
 
stage for the currency crisis. That is one aspect of the vulnerabilities to
 
external shocks.
One important determinant of private sector’s behavior including firms
 
and financial institutions is their expectations toward government behav-
ior. They assumed governments’implicit guarantees to banking sector
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 in the wake of a severe banking crisis so that claims on banks guaranteed
 
by government played a similar role to deposit insurance from banks’
perspective. Thus, in the presence of deposit insurance, there were
 
incentives in the behavior of insured banks to seek to maximize the the
 
value of their deposit insurance options by selecting the riskiest available
 
portfolio???.
Expectations by private sector induced market participants to revise
 
upward their expectation of future government deficits,which would be
 
sources of cost in the case of financial crises as a form of bail-out through
 
public fund. Given the structure of government financing, that is, the
 
difficulty of raising tax revenues or lowering government expenditures in
 
the wake of a severe banking crisis, the private agents expected that
 
future deficits would be financed,at least in part,by higher seigniorage
 
revenues. This led to expectation of higher future inflation rates and a
 
reduction in the demand for domestic currency. The resulting drain on
 
official reserves of foreign currency triggered the currency crises.
Evidence shows that Korea experienced severe currency crises in the
 
latter part of 1997. The exchange rate defined as the price of a dollar in
 
units of local currency,won, underwent vary large depreciations in a
 
short period of time. Import and export prices increased much higher in
 
response to movements in the exchange rate than either the CPI or PPI.
The CPI in Korea rose 7.2 percent between October 1997 and October
 
1998.
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(2) The Second Stage from Currency to Financial Crisis
 
Because many financial institutions did not hedge the currency mismat-
ch in their assets and liabilities,the currency crises deteriorated the weak
 
situation of financial sector and further exacerbated the initial banking
 
crises and raised the associated fiscal costs. The major portion of
 
external debt could be explained by banking sector. Out of total debt
 
increase before three years, 1994-1996, the external debt by banking
 
sector explains about 70 percent of the growth of external debt,while
 
corporate sector explains 30 percent. Note that the value of foreign
 
currency liabilities of oversea branches of banks was comparable,even
 
much larger to the external debt of domestic branches. See Table 3.
The reason for banks to exploit to increase borrowing through foreign
 
branches is that as a part of liberalization measures, banks and other
 
Figure 3 Prices in Korea
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Notes:EPI is Export Price Index;IPI is Import Price Index;PPI is Producer Price Index;and CPI is Consumer Price Index.
Source:“Statistics”at www.bok.or.kr and Datastream.
financial intermediaries were allowed to open and expand operations of
 
oversea branches.
With a weakened banking sector,it is difficult for the central bank to
 
defend the domestic currency against a sharp devaluation of the currency
(or/and floats of the currency)or it could not resist the attacks. This is
 
because the attempt to defend the currency would be too much harm to
 
the weakened banking sector???.
The effect of currency devaluation on the economy depends on the
 
structure of debt markets. The structure of debt markets, combined
 
with currency devaluation,will transmit the effect of currency crisis into
 
the full-fledged financial crisis,amplifying the impact of initial balance
 
sheet fundamental effect. The particular features of debt contracts were
 
the short duration of debt contracts and their denomination in foreign
 
currencies, that is, short-term liabilities denominated in foreign cur-
rencies. Since many debts were denominated in foreign currencies,
Figure 4 Trend and Composition of External Debt
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1997 1995 1987  1989  1991  1993 1985 1983 1981 1979
 depreciation of their currencies causes their indebtedness in domestic
 
currency terms,even though the value of their assets remains unchanged.
Furthermore,the short duration of debt contracts increased the probabil-
ity for firms to default under the currency crisis, the collapse of cur-
rencies.
The currency crisis,which caused a sharp deterioration in both finan-
cial and non-financial sector balance sheets,was transmitted to a contrac-
Table 2 Official Foreign Reserves During Crisis in Korea
(U.S$ billion)
1996.12.31 ’97.3.31 6.30 9.30 10.31 11.30 12.31 ’98.1.31
Official Foreign Reserves (A)
33.2 29.1 33.3 30.4 30.5 24.4 20.4 23.5
Overseas Branch Deposits (B)
3.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 16.9 11.3 10.9
Others (C) ・ ・ ・ ・ 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
A-(B＋C) 29.4 21.1 25.3 22.4 22.3 7.3 8.9 12.4
Source:Bank of Korea
 
Table 3 Foreign Currency Liabilities of Korean Banks
(US$100million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Domestic Branches 157 163 226 363 507 387.9
Foreign Branches 201 231 317 413 529 312.5
Sum 358 394 543 776 1,036 700.4
Source:Bank of Korea,Dooley and Shin (2000)
Table 4 BOK’s Foreign Currency Deposits in Korean Banks
(US$100million)
1997.11/3-11/7 11/10-11/1411/17-11/2111/24-11/28 Sum
 
Domestic Branches -9.9 -10.6 35.0 41.2 55.7
Foreign Branches 0.5 7.9 19.4 61.3 89.1
Sum -9.4 -2.7 54.4 102.5 144.8
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 tion in lending and a severe financial and economic crisis. Financial
 
market was then no longer able to channel funds to those with productive
 
investment opportunities,which led to devastating effects on the economy
 
as a whole.
The causes of currency and financial crisis could be reflected by
 
through which the currency crisis causes financial crisis to occur:through
 
the direct effect on the balance sheets of firms, through the further
 
negative effect on the balance sheets of the banking sector,and through
 
the effect on higher inflation???.
Externalities of an economy can be measured by variables such as gross
 
external liabilities,the ratio of external liabilities to GDP,the short term
 
external liabilities relative to total external liabilities, and the ratio of
 
short-term liabilities to foreign exchange reserves.
Gross external liabilities had been growing at rate exceeding 30％
from 1994 to 1996,a period of comprenhensive capital account liberaliza-
tion. The amount of external liabilities relative to GDP was also rising
 
rapidly over the same period,rising from the 20％ level prior to 1994 to
 
above 30％ by 1996 and 1997. A rapid increase in private sector borrow-
ings-both direct borrowings of the corporate sector and bank borrowings
 
to finance investments of the corporate sector-accounted for most of the
 
increase in external debt.
With regard to the external liability to GDP ratio reached a level
 
around 33％ in 1997,the issue is whether the level itself was probably not
 
an unsustainable one, given Korea’s potential economic growth. The
 
other problems with regard to external debt lay in the relatively high
 
portion of short-term external debt,and the term-mismatch,which was a
 
possible signal of serious external liquidity problems.
Indeed the critical cause of financial crisis of Korea arose from the fact
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 that,throughout the 1990s,the share of short-term liabilities out of total
 
external liabilities remained at a level of more than 50％while the foreign
 
exchange reserve position was not sufficient to cover the short-tem
 
external liabilities. In other words,the buildup of short-term debt that
 
financial and capital-account liberalization engendered during 1990s made
 
the structure of Korean economy vulnerable to external shocks such as
 
reversal in market sentiment.
There are valuable implications from stock market before the crisis,
which is worth noting. The value of the banking and finance sectors fell
 
by large amounts before the currency crisis. In the case of Korea, the
 
manufacturing sector index show volatility but actually rose up before
 
the crisis. Relatively sound macroeconomic indicators such as stable
 
GDP growth,budget balance,high saving rates,low inflation,in Table 5,
were disguising structural vulnerability in terms of high foreign exchange
 
liquidity risks.
Figure 5 Stock Market Performance of the Korean Banks
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Source:Bank of Korea
 4. Responses to the Crisis
 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy:In attenuating the 1988 recession and in
 
laying the foundation for an economic recovery in 1999,Korea responded
 
to crises with tightening of fiscal and monetary policy intended to stem
 
the collapse of the currency and restore confidence. Korea did not allow
 
its monetary base to expand rapidly. By the end of 1998,the amount of
 
base money became roughly same as Korea had at the onset of crisis.
After the period of tight money around at the end of 1988,Korea signifi-
cantly raised their money supplies about 37 percent???. The framework
 
for both monetary and exchange rate policies has changed significantly
 
since the crisis in important aspects???. The need for high interest rate
 
will depend to some extent on exchange rate developments.
Structural Reforms:More important in a longer-term perspective was
 
the introduction of a wide range of structural reforms. In short, the
 
objective was to create an economic system based on market forces,with
 
Table 5 Macroeconomic Fundamentals in Korea
(％)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fiscal Susplus??/GDP -1.9 -0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.3 -1.5 -4.2
Current Acct/GDP -2.82 -1.25 0.29 -0.96 -1.74 -4.42 -1.71 12.46
Real Effective Exchange Rate?? 93.5 98.8 100.9 98.3 98.0 96.0 104.6 131.1
CPI Inflation 9.3 6.3 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.5 7.5
Real GDP Growth 9.2 5.4 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 -5.8
Gross Savings Ratio 37.3 36.4 36.2 35.5 35.5 33.8 33.4 33.2
Notes:1)Consolidated public sector.
2)Trade volume weighted,numbers below 100 means overvaluation.
Source:National Statistical Office,Bank of Korea,Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omy,and KDI.
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 the government role shifted from direct intervention to ensuring the
 
sound functioning of a market economy. The policy content of the IMF
 
programs was aimed at the structural weakness. The government pur-
sues structural reforms in four sectors: financial restructuring, firms
(Chaebols) restructuring, public sector restructuring, and labor sector
 
restructuring. The major lines of these reforms included:strengthening
 
competition by reducing trade barrier and promoting inflows of foreign
 
direct investment;improving corporate governance to force the chaebols
 
to focus on profitability and shareholder value;rehabilitating the finan-
cial system by re-capitalizing viable financial institutions and addressing
 
the NPL problem;establishing a new supervisory framework for the
 
financial sector in order to avoid future crises;reducing the government’s
 
role in the economy through the privatization of state-owned enterprises
 
and by regulatory reform;increasing the flexibility of labor markets by
 
loosening controls on layoffs and the use of temporary workers while
 
strengthening the social safety net.
5. The Recovery from the Crisis
 
Two years after being hit by severe financial crisis,the performance of
 
Korea’s economy in 1999 was outstanding by almost any indicators,
showing the recovery from the crisis. Growth rate of real output
 
increase almost 11％ from-7％ in real output just after the crisis. Given
 
the wide range of structural reforms,factors that result in outstanding
 
performances are a recovery in confidence,the recovery and stabilization
 
of the currency,favorable external conditions,technical factors,notably
 
the large contribution of inventory adjustment,a sharp expansion in the
 
information and telecommunication sectors.
The main contribution to the upturn was the strong rebound in domes
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 tic demand. The driving forces of increase in aggregate domestic
 
demand were buoyant private consumption,a turnaround of investment in
 
machinery and equipment and a slower adjustment of inventory
 
decumulation. The turnaround in fixed investment hence, the fixed
 
capital formation, was due primarily to the turn in corporate
 
profitability???,the opportunities available in emerging industries such as
 
information and telecommunications, venture businesses as emerging
 
industries played a key role in the pick up in investment???.
The financial crisis resulted in the aid from the IMF to restore stability
 
of Korean economy. Korea’s initiative in implementing structural
 
reforms helped to lay the foundation for the strong recovery beginning in
 
the third quarter of 1998. The goal of the economic reform was not just
 
overcome financial crisis at hand but to establish a new economic para-
digm in which market principles function effectively and transparently.
That was only way to regain the credibility of international community.
While many legal and regulatory reforms have been introduced, the
 
challenge now is to implement effectively the reforms so as to change
 
behavior of all sectors:household,firms,and government,who are par-
ticipating in the new reformed economic environment after the financial
 
crisis.
?.The Prolonged Recession and Banking Crisis in Japan
 
There have been various arguments and debates regarding the eco-
nomic performances of Japan which could be among others represented
 
by the slow srowth, the prolonged recession, and the financial sector’s
 
problem. Here,we should light on the issues from three aspects:demand
 
side and supply side. We also focus on the effect of asset volatily in
 
Japanese economy.
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 1. Demand Side Diagnosis
 
The prolonged recession in Japan during 1990s could be partially
 
explained by the financial propagation mechanism which focused on the
 
collapse of asset prices and its effects on banking sector and corporate,
especially the effect on the balance sheets of corporate and financial
 
sectors,among others.
The combination of these two factors,such as decrease in stock and
 
real estate prices after the burst of bubble(asset deflation)and decrease
 
in lending by banks (kashi-shiburi), had adverse effect on aggregate
 
demand. These factors induced a downturn in aggregate real economic
 
activity through declining expenditure of consumption and investment by
 
household and firms. Weak investment with financial constraint due to
 
credit crunch contributed to make the recession be deepened and pro-
longed???.
The result has been an adverse shift in aggregate demand,leading to
 
low growth and low inflation. Inflation in Japan was indeed negative,
equivalently prices declines,in 1995 and 1996. Deflation is an important
 
issue to be explained to understand the recession in Japan.
(1) Financial Sector:Asset Market and the Behavior of Banks
 
Recent decrease in asset prices had impact on financial sector through
 
deterioration in the private sectors’balance sheets because declining asset
 
prices reduce the value of collateral that borrowers can use to secure
 
loan. In this situation,banks(and other financial intermediaries making
 
loans),which have a substantial contraction in their capital,will face two
 
choices:either cut back their lending (a capital crunch);or can try to raise
 
new capital. Recent experiences in Japan showed that financial interme-
diaries,particularly banks with weakened balance sheets,led to a capital
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 crunch which in turn contributed partially recession and lower growth
 
during 1990s.
(2) Non-financial Corporations Sector: Asset Market and the
 
Behavior of Firms
 
Non-financial corporation sector in Japan have been suffered losses on
 
their assets holdings, about half each in land and equities???. A wide-
spread deterioration of balance sheets among firms,mainly borrowers,
worsened both adverse selection and moral hazard problem in financial
 
markets,thus promoting financial instability. Given weak banking sec-
tor, credit crunch, and financial constraint, firms reduced or delayed
 
investment projects,which were one of main factors leading recession and
 
slow growth. The reasons or channels of spillover effect through bal-
ance sheet are as follows:
Direct channel through collateral:If a borrower defaults on a loan,the
 
lender can sell the collateral to make up for at least some of the loss on
 
the loan. But if asset prices fall,and the value of collateral falls as well,
then the balance sheet of financial sector is deteriorated.
Net worth and Stock market:If a firm has high net worth,then even if
 
it defaults on its debt payments,the lender can take the title to the firm’s
 
net worth,sell it off,and use the proceeds to recoup some of the losses
 
from the loan. A sharp decrease in stock price reduces the market
 
valuation of a firms’net worth,and thus little incentive to reduce NPLs.
Unexpected changes in the inflation: In Japanese economy in which
 
inflation has been moderate for long period of time so that debt contracts
 
with long duration have interest payments fixed in nominal terms for a
 
substantial period of time. However, as an recent deflation such as
 
decreases in real asset prices has occurred,the value of firm’s liabilities
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 in real terms rises and,as a result,its net worth in real terms declines.
2. Supply Side Diagnosis
 
In the longer horizon, the problem of banking system could lead an
 
adverse shift in aggregate supply. Banking system(or financial system)
in bad shape will induce cost of supply side to increase. The problem of
 
Japan in the 1990s as being due in part to the problem of its banking
 
sector seems to have led to the adverse impact not only on both aggregate
 
demand but also on aggregate supply. In the medium run, the shift in
 
aggregate supply may contribute a long duration of recession for a nearly
 
decade,in addition to shift in aggregate demand in the short run.
Whether and how do financial sector affects the supply side of
 
Japanese economy such as the productivity as a whole and the sectoral
 
productivity ? What are impediments in linking aggregate supply and
 
demand ? These are open questions to be answered to improve under-
standing about Japanese economy.
3. The Effect of Asset Price Volatility
 
During the past two decades,Japanese economy has experienced large
 
boom-burst cycles in the prices of various assets,represented by prices of
 
equities and real estate such as stocks,land,residential housing. Asset
 
price fluctuations has been argued as one of factors which attributed the
 
boom period of 1980s and repression in 1990s in Japan. The collapse of
 
the Japanese asset markets,real estate and stock,in the early 1990s had
 
been influenced the real economic activity through various channels.
One of the reasons why fluctuation of land and equity prices is impor-
tant is the role of asset in the credit market and the impact of values of
 
assets on investment. A large fraction of business investment in Japan is
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financed by loans through banks and financial intermediaries that require
 
collateral???. Thus a large fraction of business investment projects
 
financed by secured loans is likely to be affected by endogenous changes
 
in the value of collateralizeable assets. Further, land has served as a
 
primary collateral in the investment financing of Japanese corporations.
Of total secured bank loans about 45％ have been collateralized by land,
while only about 3％ have been backed up by stocks and bonds. Thus
 
land prices might be closely related to real activities in Japan.
This has particularly been the case since the financial liberalization in
 
the early 1980s. Financial liberalization caused a rise in stock prices,
which enabled firms to raise funds by issuing equity and bonds which are
 
alternative to loans from bank. This in turn prompted banks to lend
 
funds to firms without access to credit markets. But at that time,those
 
firms which had not established long-term relationships with banks and
 
thus land held by them served as collateral. In this way, land became
 
very important as collateral in Japan???.
Land values held by the corporate sector,particularly by small busines-
ses,rose dramatically with the asset price inflation in the mid of 1980s.
The land value owned by corporations in all industries was approximate-
ly 50 trillion yen in 1984 and rose to around 120 trillion yen in 1990. Of
 
the net increase in land values about 75％ was purchased by small firms.
Thus,if it exists,such an excessively sharp increase in land holding by
 
small firms itself could make the magnitude of collateral effects bigger.
Given the role of asset,especially the role of land in Japanese economy,
it is important to understand sources of asset price fluctuation in general
 
and sources of land price fluctuation in order to clarify impacts on real
 
activity and business cycles in the economy. Asset pricing model will
 
help understand the link between financial market and the real sector of
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 the economy.
?. International Comparison and Discussion: Evidences from
 
Korea-Japan
 
1. Financial System
 
The deterioration of balance sheets in the financial sector is an impor-
Japan (1990＝100)
South Korea (1995＝100)
Figure 6 Industrial Production:Korea and Japan
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Source:IMF (2000)
tant factor causing financial crises in Korea and the banking crisis and
 
the prolonged recession in Japan. Korea experienced severe banking-
financial sector crises that began before the currency crises,while Japan
 
also experienced banking―financial crisis but did not fall into the cur-
rency crisis. This implies that changes in financial structure is an impor-
tant element in the development of financial crises. This is because the
 
deterioration of balance sheets of both the banking and corporate sectors
 
have developed before the onset of the Korean financial crisis. Note that
 
prior to the crisis,the loan classification criteria and loan loss provision
 
requirements in Korea and Japan had been very lenient compared to
 
international standards. Here we will discuss the weak balance-sheet
 
fundamentals of Korean economy relative to Japan,especially focusing
 
on corporate sector which,in turn,is the main borrower from the finan-
cial sector and the sources of banking crisis such as bad loans???.
2. Corporation Sector’s Balance Sheet Fundamentals
 
The weak corporate structure of nonfinancial sector, manufacturing
 
sector, can be characterized by excessive debt and low profitability.
Korean corporations played a pivotal role in the country’s financial crisis,
while Japanese firms played a similar role in the banking problem but did
 
not fall into the financial crises as Korea and other Asian countries.
Structural problem of corporation sector in both Korea and Japan can be
 
characterized by some measurements of the structure of debt which are
 
described in the balance sheet fundamentals.
One feature of debt contracts in corporate sector is the highly leveraged
 
corporate financial structure,which is an important source of structural
 
vulnerability. The over-investment by firms is one factor to contribute
 
the highly leverages financial structure in corporate sector. As firms
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 expanded under this corporate financial structure, the corporate sector
 
became increasingly vulnerable to negative shocks. Firms in Korea had
 
undertaken large investment projects and diversification drives between
 
1993 and 1996,financed by aggressive short-term borrowing from banks.
But investment failed to generate enough returns to cover the cost of
 
capital. Pre-tax rates of return on capital of industrial companies were
 
below pre-tax cost of debt in Korea between 1993-1995 except the steel
 
industry which realized profits exceeding debt charges. Excess capacity
 
through over-investment and strong competition in the domestic and
 
international markets made thin profit margin further thin. This total
 
liabilities,measured in percent of GDP,of Korean firms has been continu-
ously increasing,while the ratio of total liabilities in Japanese firms has
 
been relatively steady. The total liability-equity ratios of Korean firms
 
show higher than Japan during all the period,1985-1998. The gap has
 
been rapidly widen since 1995 and peaked just before the crisis. The
 
ratio of Korea shows high volatility. One difference in the structure of
 
debt between Japan and Korea is the term structure of liabilities. In
 
contrast, the ratio has been decreasing 1980s and 1990s. Short-term
 
liabilities measured by the ratio of GDP show the rapid increase during
 
1990s in Korea,but the ratio has been gradually decreasing throughout
 
1990s. When we look at short-term liabilities measured by ratio of total
 
liabilities, we can find an interesting pattern of short-term liabilities.
From mid-1980 to early 1990s, short-term liabilities ratio out of total
 
liabilities in Japan is greater than one of Korea and the pattern was
 
reversed between early and mid-1990s. However, the ratio of Korean
 
firms is declining since 1996,while one of Japanese firms shows gradual
 
up and down.
Korean economy is dominated by the large business groups,chaebols.
― ―134 社会関係研究 第７巻 特別号
The top 30 chaebol produces roughly 16-17 percent of Korea’s GDP and
 
account for about 40 percent of manufacturing GDP, around half of
 
export,but only 5 percent of employment. Chaebols are highly leveraged
 
Figure 7 Structure of Corporate Finance:International Comaprison
 
Liabilities of Manufacturing Sector, 1985-1998
 
Korea, Japan,USA
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Sources:IMF (2000),Data provided by the Korean authorities;Japan:
Ministry of Finance,Nomura database;U.S.Census Bureau,Quartely Financial Report for Manufacturing,Mining and Trade Corporations.
and diversified. The debt-equity ratio of Korea’s conglomerates (big
 
business group)was even higher than that of small and medium size
 
Figure 8 Indicators of Profitability and Debt
 
Manufacturing Sector in Korea:1985-1998
 
By Size of Firms (In percent)
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Sources:IMF (2000,95),Data provided by the Korean authorities;Japan:
Ministry of Finance, Nomura database;U.S. Census Bureau, Quartely Financial Report for Manufacturing,Mining and Trade Corporations.
1/Defined as net income as percent of total assets
2/Defined as net income as percent of sales.
3/Defined operating income as percent of interest expense.
corporation. The debt-to-equity ratio for top 30 chaebol jumped to 518
 
percent from 387 percent attend of 1996, while the debt ratio in all
 
manufacturing for large firms and the small and medium enterprises rose
 
from 100 percent to 400 percent point between 1996 and end 1997. This
 
was more than double of the average of Japan and OECD. This implies
 
that excess debt was not limited to a few large business groups. This
 
may reflect both characteristics of loan market and the chaebol’s strategy
 
of debt-financed growth and diversification in Korea. Bank lending to
 
the top 30 rose to 43 percent in 1997. This aspect generated the high risk
 
because as profits fell, the corporate sector became vulnerable to a
 
cyclical downturn and change in interest rates.
The highly leveraged corporate financial structure and the high finan-
cial expenses due to high domestic interest rate had adverse effects on the
 
profit margin in corporate sector in Korea. High debt-equity ratio
 
combined with domestic high interest rates produced chronic difficulty
 
for all firms(the big industrial groups and the small and medium firms).
Even during the boom periods of 1994-95 before the crisis, the
 
profitability for the smaller chaebols was weak. The profitability of
 
corporate sector had been steadily deteriorated before the crisis. Given
 
this highly leveraged financial structure,the negative external shock such
 
as the negative terms of trade shock in 1996 caused the significant decline
 
in corporate profitability. For some firms,this meant heavy pressure for
 
the already thin margins of profitability. The sharp decrease in profit
 
was reflected in the deterioration of the corporate balance sheets. The
 
effect on the profit varied depending on the size of corporate group even
 
in the the large conglomerates. The profit of smaller chaebols decreased
 
more raipdly than the larger chaebols.
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 3. Shifts in Regulatory Regime and Financial Structure
 
What were factors promoting deterioration of balance-sheet fundamen-
tals ? Despite the strong macroeconomic fundamentals, as the asym-
metric information analysis indicates,Korea was vulnerable to a financial
 
crisis because of financial conditions represented by the weak balance-
sheet fundamentals for the overall economy. However, key questions
 
naturally follow:What caused balance sheets to deteriorate in both Korea
 
and Japan ? Why did not Japan with the deteriorated balance-sheet
 
fundamentals get into the process from the currency to the financial crisis
 
during the period of Asian crisis ? Are there qualitative differences in
 
financial conditions such as the balance-sheet fundamentals? Are there
 
differences in terms of regulatory regime such as ways to regulate or
 
deregulate?
One aspect of currency crisis was the fiscal regulatory regime which
 
could be characterized by large perspective government deficit associated
 
with implicit bail out guarantees to failing banking system. The basic
 
idea of this line of argument is as follows. Given this government’s
 
implicit guarantees to their banking sectors,market participants revised
 
upwards their expectations of future government deficits. Given the
 
structure of government financing, that is, the difficulty of raising tax
 
revenues or lowering government expenditures in the wake of a severe
 
banking crisis,the private agents expected that future deficits would be
 
financed,at least in part, by higher seigniorage revenues. This led to
 
expectation of higher future inflation rates and a reduction in the demand
 
for domestic currency. The resulting drain on official reserves of foreign
 
currency triggered the currency crises. Because many financial institu-
tions did not hedge the currency mismatch in their assets and liabilities,
the currency crises exacerbated the initial banking crises and raised the
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associated fiscal costs.
Fiscal cost of banking crisis:This fiscal cost are measured by very
 
large government’s liabilities which arise from the implicit guarantees
 
and the need to restructure the banking system. Research found that
 
traditional measures of government deficit or debt gave no indication of
 
currency crises to come in Korea and that the debt situation of govern-
ment appeared radically different before and after the crisis???.
The other aspect often cited as the primary impetus for the subsequent
 
credit expansion and hence deterioration of the bank asset quality leading
 
up to financial crises,is the shift in financial regulatory regime such as
 
financial liberalization and deregulation in financial markets without
 
tight supervisory regulations. Both Korea and Japan had liberalized
 
their financial systems and opened up their capital markets gradually
 
throughout the two decades. However, they had different ways and
 
speeds of deregulation so that the developments of debt and equity
 
market were different. The resulting incentives and behaviors of banks
(and other financial intermediaries)and nonfinancial corporations were
 
consequently somewhat different in several respects. In Japan,deregula-
tion allowed large bank customers to quickly shift from bank financing to
 
capital market funding. Thus large Japanese firms,particularly manu-
facturers, now almost as independent of bank financing relative to the
 
past???. However, deregulation was less favorable for savers, they
 
continued to deposit their money with banks. On that stage of deregula-
tion,Japanese banks were not allowed into new business so that their new
 
loans primarily flowed to customers such as small business who did not
 
have enough access to other direct financial markets but bank loan.
Banks also expanded real estate lending. As a result, both actions by
 
banks under the regulatory shift turned out to be unprofitable,accumulat-
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 ing large bad loans.
Credit growth in Korea was quite rapid before the crisis can be
 
measured by the level of domestic credit of financial institutions in both
 
real terms and relative to GDP. Although domestic credit rose to nearly
 
200％ of GDP, and real domestic credit more than quadrupled in the
 
decade preceding the crisis,whether a pronounced increase in the trend
 
after financial liberalization occurred or not is not inconclusive.. In
 
addition,although credit growth in Korea was high before the crisis, it
 
was not as rapid as in Mexico or other East Asian countries 15 before
 
their crises.
Financial liberalization did play an important role in increasing the
 
exposure of financial institutions to foreign exchange risk,it may have
 
not been as critical to creation of a lending boom as in other emerging
 
market countries that have experienced a crisis. An alternative factor
 
to the rapid lending growth, in turn, the deterioration in the balance
 
sheets of the financial sector seems to be other factors than financial
 
liberalization as a whole. We have to look at how different degree of
 
and different speed of deregulation has been proceeded over financial
 
sector relative to corporation sector. That is,asymmetric shift in regu-
lation of financial sector relative to other sector may explain a formation
 
of financial structure of balance sheet which has generated a vicious
 
circle of a financial crisis. While regulations on financial institutions
 
were being relaxed in order to enable them to engage in a wider set of
 
activities, an implicit government safety net for financial institutions
 
along with weak prudential supervision led to excessive risk-taking.
One impetus to increased short-term foreign borrowing by financial
 
institutions was the resalt of not only the financial liberalization process
 
but also a process of government regulatory shift.
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In 1993,the Korean government expanded the list of usage for which
 
financial institutions could provide foreign-currency denominated loans.
Short-term foreign borrowing by financial institutions was allowed at the
 
time,while the government maintained the quantity restriction on long-
term foreign borrowing as the means of capital flow management. The
 
result was a dramatic increase in short-term foreign debts of financial
 
institutions to finance strong investment demand of the corporate sector
 
as the economy entered a boom in 1994. In addition, the number of
 
financial institutions engaging in foreign-currency-denominated activities
 
increased sharply with financial liberalization. From 1994 to 1996, a
 
total of 24 finance companies were transformed into merchant banking
 
corporations. This meant a corresponding increase in the number of
 
participants in international financial markets because merchant banks
 
were allowed to engage in foreign exchange transactions,while finance
 
companies were not. During the same period,Korean banks opened 28
 
foreign branches which gave them greater access to foreign funds.
These changes in the institutional framework contributed importantly to
 
the rapid growth in foreign-currency borrowing by financial institutions
 
and businesses documented above.
The long standing practice of government intervention in credit alloca-
tion as well as in key managerial decision has weakened banking sector
 
during the 1970-80s. A process of government regulatory shift to finan-
cial deregulation, without fully considering the structurally weakened
 
banking sector,contributed to the onset of financial crisis. In the inter-
ventional environment, there were not sufficient credit analysis and,
superficial supervision on the part of regulators and there were lending
 
concentration on the part of banking industry. This kind of financial
 
environment caused incentives to high leveraging on the part of the
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 corporate sector.
To have better understanding recent financial problems in both Korea
 
and Japan,it is also important to investigate causalities between behavior
 
of private sectors, financial sector and nonfinancial corporate sector,
reflected in balance sheet fundamentals and the financial regulatory
 
shifts. We need to decompose the aggregate regulatory shift into sec-
tors: asymmetric or unbalanced aspect of deregulation over different
 
sector such as banks,city and local banks,other financial intermediaries,
nonfinancial corporate sector, large firms,small firms. The identifica-
tion of causalities may provide us useful implications about the timing of
 
regulatory shifts and the conditions to prevent financial crisis or to
 
minimize the cost of financial problems in the future. Given those
 
findings,we could discuss which social infrastructure should be required in
 
the economy where individuals with large wealth are willing to make the
 
long-term investments, channelling to investment in technology for the
 
long-run economic success as a whole. It is useful to think of “social
 
infrastructure”as the rules, regulations, and institutions that enforce
 
them. In this way of thinking,government policies and institutions make
 
up the social infrastructure of the economy. In this sense, they them-
selves are“ideas”which are there waiting to be found.
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Endnotes
⑴ Mishkin (1999,2000).
⑵ The standard“five C”risk factors for a borrower usually include
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 capacity(to repay),capital, character, collateral, and conditions of
 
the economy. See Mishkin (1999).
⑶ For example,a moral hazard problem arises if,after a lender has
 
purchased a debt security from a borrower, the borrower increases
 
the risks originally associated with the debt security by investing his
 
borrowed funds in more risky projects than he originally reported to
 
the lender.
⑷ Recent research suggests that weak balance sheets led to a capital
 
crunch which hindered growth in the U.S. economy during the early
 
1990s. Bernanke and Lown(1991),Berger and Udell(1994),Mishkin
(2000).
⑸ Expectations of investors or stock markets are important in that
 
asset price means the evaluation of stream of current and future’s
 
cash flows,precisely the expected value of discounted present value
 
of current and future part of profits. In this sense, perspective
 
toward performance of firms by investors or financial markets will
 
affect the net worth thereby the balance sheet of corporate sector.
⑹ Due to increased demand for credit or a decline in the money supply.
⑺ Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
⑻ It is often said that, in this case where interest rates in a credit
 
crunch will tend to rise,good credit risks are less likely to want to
 
borrow while bad credit risks are still willing to borrow. But it is
 
hard for us to distinguish between good and bad credits. We only
 
can attach the conditional probability of failure of future projects
 
based on risks.
⑼ Negative Stock Market Shock:stock prices are the current market
 
valuation of corporate assets. All else equal, a sharp decline in
 
stock market prices means a decline in corporate real net worth,that
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 is,the market valuation of a firm’s net worth.
Negative inflation rate shock unexpected changes in the rate of
 
inflation If the debt payments specified in corporate debt contracts
 
are fixed in nominal terms,a decrease in the inflation rate can have
 
a substantial negative impact on the real value of corporate net
 
worth. When inflation turns out to be less than anticipated,which
 
can occur by an outright deflation as occurred in Japan recently,the
 
value of firms’liabilities in real terms rises,and its net worth in real
 
terms declines. Recall that the real interest rate is defined to be the
 
difference between the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate.
Thus,the definition of the real interest rate from period T to T＋1
 
implies that, for any given nominal interest rate, a decrease in the
 
inflation rate corresponds to an increase in the real interest rate.
This increase in the real interest rate raises the real burden of debt
 
on corporate borrowers,and hence the real value of their liabilities,
without affecting the real value of their assets. It follows that
 
corporate net worth declines in real terms. To avoid this problem,
corporations in countries with highly volatile domestic inflation rates
 
sometimes issue debt denominated in the currencies of foreign coun-
tries whose inflation rates are expected to be more stable over time.
This is not a risk-free strategy, however. As will next be seen,
negative shocks to the domestic exchange rate can have substantial
 
negative effects on corporate real net worth when corporate debt is
 
denominated in foreign currencies.
Negative exchange rate shock:all else equal, a depreciation or
 
devaluation of a country’s domestic exchange rate will increase the
 
real debt burden,hence the real liabilities,of any corporation whose
 
debt is denominated in foreign currencies. On the other hand,since
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 corporate assets are typically denominated in domestic currency,a
 
depreciation or devaluation of the domestic exchange rate will
 
generally not have any direct effect on the real value of corporate
 
assets. It follows that corporate real net worth will tend to decline
 
following a depreciation or devaluation of a country’s domestic
 
exchange rate.
Positive interest shock: as previously noted, increased interest
 
rates on financial instruments can increase adverse selection in
 
financial markets and hence make lenders less willing to lend. In
 
this case, the supply curve for loanable funds will shift left. This
 
will tend to cause interest rates to increase even further, thus am-
plifying the original adverse selection problem.
? The ratio of external debt to GDP reached around 25％ at the end
 
of 1997,which was not an sustainable level,given Korea’s economic
 
growth potential as Chen(1992)and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin(1996).
? Rodrik and Velasco(2000)“Short Term Capital Flows”,NBER WP
 
No.7364.
? The terms of trade deteriorated nearly 20％ which is the largest
 
drop since the first oil shock of 1974.
? The unit price of semiconductor chips fell by more than 70 percent.
? The insolvencies of Korean big business groups in 1997 were as
 
follows.
Hanbo (1.23, corporate reorganization), Sammi (3.18, corporate
 
reorganization), Jinro (4.28, subject to agreement for preventing
 
insolvency),Dainong (5.19,subject to agreement for preventing insol-
vency),Hanshinkongyung (5.31,corporate reorganization),Kia (7.14,
corporate reorganization), Ssang Bang Wool (10.16, composition),
Haitai(11.1,composition),New Core(11.3,composition and corporate
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 reorganization). The average number of firms defaulting each
 
month during 1997 was more than 1,400,nearly a 50 percent increase
 
from 1996. Information from Bank of Korea (1999).
Monthly Average Number of Firms Defaulting on Promissory Notes,1993-97
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of firms 792 983 1,166 966 1,431
Change from previous year -11.7％ 18.4％ 24.3％ -17.2％ 48.1％
Source:Hahm (1999,117)
? A package of$57 billion in official support was assembled,with$21
 
billion from IMF,$14 billion from other multilateral sources,and$22
 
billion in“second-line of defence”funds available from US and other
 
bilateral sources. For series of Letter of Intent of the government of
 
Korea,which describes the policies that Korea intends to implement
 
in the context of its request for financial support from the IMFfor
 
details. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/mempub.asp
? The reasons why banks had excessive risk-taking attitudes:⑴ the
 
lack of risk management system to screen and monitor,such as the
 
well-trained officers,risk-assessment systems,other experts to evalu-
ate and respond to risk appropriately. ⑵ Weak financial regulation
 
and supervision.
? See Merton(1977),Dooley and Shin(2000)in this line of literarture.
? Any rise in interest rate to keep the domestic currency from
 
depreciating has an additional effect of weakening the banking
 
system further due to the negative effect on bank’s balance sheets.
This effect occurs due to their maturity mismach and their exposure
 
to increased credit risk when the economy declines. Under this
 
situation and the debt structure, if the central bank raises interest
 
rates sufficiently enough to defend the currency,the banking system
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 may default due to sharp increase in debt payment burden. Under
 
the recognition or expectation of the inability of the central bank to
 
defend the currency,investors or speculators will have greater incen-
tive to attack because expected profits from selling the currency is
 
likely to be realized in the economy with a weakened banking sector
 
and a non-float exchange regime.
? South Korea avoided a large rise in inflation, while inflation in
 
Mexico and Indonesia increased over 50％ after the currency crisis.
? Some interpreted this evidence as Korean government eventually
 
moved to partially monetize their debt,but there was a substantial
 
lag until they did so. Burnside,Eichenbaun,and Rebelo (2000).
? The Bank of Korea became legally independent in 1998 and its
 
governor replaced by the Minister of Finance as chairman of the
 
Monetary Policy Committee.
? The ratio of net income to total asset,31/2％ in 1999 from negative
 
in 1997;the total borrowing to asset ratio for listed manufacturing
 
companies,40％ in 1999 from 58％ in 1997.
? Venture business in Korea was boosted by a doubling in the number
 
of Internet start-up companies to about 2400 in 1999.
? Large firms in the Keiretsu had good access to credit(lending from
 
banks)relative to small and medium size firms. Large firms which
 
had long relation with main bank had diversified way to finance with
 
development of capital markets such as equities,direct finance rather
 
indirect finance such as loan from banks. Under this situation,
banks have to lend funds to firms which do not have alternative way
 
to finance but loan. This cause banks to be reluctant to or be
 
conservative in lending behavior.
? Corporations in construction sector face relatively strong impact
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 because of their substantial real estate holdings. The overall
 
decrease in the value of net worth is equivalent to 16％ of their total
 
balance sheets at the outset (OECD survey).
? The degree of effect varies according to the size of firms in Japan,
the share of bank loans to small/medium firms is very high. In 1988
 
about 75％ of bank loans to manufacturing firms were received by
 
small firms. Of total outstanding loans by all banks to all industries,
on average about 50％ was received by small firms. The small/
mediun firms that are more likely to be exposed to financial accelera-
tor effects. Bernanke et al.(1995).
? Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998)find that real activities such as invest-
ment in Japan strongly depend on land prices.
? When relying on the official data in both Korea and Japan, it is
 
difficult to conclude that there had been a substantial deterioration in
 
bank balance sheets prior to the financial crisis. Thus, it is neces-
sary to adjust the bank balance sheets by applying consistent criteria
 
in order to uncover the true situation. See Hahm and Mishkin(2000,
11-17)for the adjustment of data.
? Burnside,Rechenbaum,and Rebelo (2000).
? T.Hoshi and A.Kashyap (2000).
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 Appendix：Circulation of Propagation of Financial Crisis
 
Labor Market
 
Financial& Real Asset Markets Real& Non-financial Sector
(Firms,Households) ⇨
Goods Market Financial Sector ⇨
(“ ”)
③Higher Inflation
⇨Rise in Interest Rate
(Fisher Effect)
②Further deterioration in balance sheets of the banking sector
⇨Demand for Credit
⇨Supply of Credit
 
Contraction or Slow-
down (Credit Crunch or Credit Rationing)
?Financial Position
①Direct effect on the balance sheet of firms 
Balance Sheet Fundamentals
⇨
Economic Crisis ⇨
Financial Crisis⇨?Aggregate Spending (?Investment,Consumption)in Short-run
⇨?Aggregate Supply in the long-run Expectation
(Capital Formation⇩;Working Capital⇩)
Asset Markets
 
Structure of Debt Markets
(Debt Contracts)
＊Inability of Central Banks
＊Fixed Exchange Rate
 
Certainty:Speculators
⇨ Currency Crisis
(Devaluation,Collapse of Currency)
Outflow of Capital
 
Speculative Attacks
 
Uncertainty:Investors
 
Structural Vulnerabilities:Weakened State of Financial System
 
Corporate Firms Sectors⇧
⇨BalanceSheet Fundamentals
 
International  Business Cycles (Terms of Trade Sh o c k) D o w n t u r n s Monetary Tightening
 
International Market
 
Asset Markets
(Credit Market)
Value of Collateral Interest Expenses
［Net Worth］
⇧⇩⇧ Spill over⇨Lneding Boom in Loan Market(Banking Sector)
⇨Excess Risk-Taking
⇨NPL (large bad loan)
⇄
Exogenous Changes in Economic Environment and Policy Regime
 
Financial sector
(banks and other financial institutions)
⇨Balance Sheet Fundamentals 
Financial Liberalization Inflow of⇨ International Capital (changes in the debt structure)
⇩
⇩
⇩
⇩
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